Theories for Determinants of Emotional States

Theories for Determinants of Emotional StatesINTRODUCTIONAn soulfulness fast asleep at night is suddenly awakened by a loud noise coming from somewhere within the house. He immediately becomes physiologic agitated the body begins to sweat, the heart beats faster, and hands begin to tremble. Does he experience fear, or perhaps some other emotion such as anger, or even happiness?Schachter and Singer (1962) proposed a two-factor model that specifies the conditions under which mountain giveing experience one particular emotion or a nonher when attendd with an emotionally exciting event, such as impending danger. This model states that a persons emotional response to danger is dependent on the interaction between their physiological arousal and cognitive appraisal of the situation (e.g. whether it is dicey or not). Ordinarily, danger would trigger biological changes, such as increased heart rate, trembling, crying, and perspiration. These physiological changes in form determine b oth the intensity (i.e. direct) and timberland (i.e. type) of our emotional response. However, the particular type of emotion experienced depends on how we cognitively perceive or read the situation. For example, we experience fear if the situation is appraised as spartan or life moody, such as an approaching lion, or an imminent category 4 tornado.SUPPORTING ARGUMENTSIn the scenario described at the beginning of this essay, the individual woken suddenly by a noise, and physiologically aroused will experience emotional arousal. The intensity of his emotions will be a direct function of his level of physiological arousal. So, for example, we will experience rattling strong emotions if his heart is beating extremely fast and he is sweating profusely. However, the type of emotion experienced will depend on how is appraises the situation. He will experience fear if for example he believes a burglar has broken into the house and is armed and dangerous. By agate line he may experie nce anger if he knows that his excitable pet dog probably knocked something down while chasing his cat around the house. Or he may experience happiness if he knows the noise was caused by his loving fiance who has just returned from the airport after long holiday her parents, and perhaps tripped everywhere something when entering the darkened house. Schachter and Singers (1962) two- factor model is actually a redevelopment of the James-Lange theory. James Lange originally proposed that emotional experience is contingent on the physiological changes induce by an event. Thus, for example, imminent natural hazard for example will first trigger an emotional response in an individual, for example anxiety. Because they feel anxious, the person will experience physiological changes consistent with this emotion, for example increased heart rate, and perspiration.ALTERNATIVE EXPLANATIONSWhether physiological changes precede emotional arousal, or vice versa, is a controversial subject. Psyc hologist Walter hit (1927/1987) proposed an model, known as the Cannon-Bard theory, which contends that physiological arousal is in fact contingent on emotional experience. It can be argued that human organisms are not very good at supervise physiological changes in their body. For example, subtle changes in heart rate, or mild increases in perspiration may go undetected (Chwalisz et al, 1988). If so, then people may simply fail to experience any emotion, regardless of their appraisals of the situation. Yet, people generally react instantaneously to danger, exhibiting signs of emotional disturbance, without necessarily being mindful of an increase in heart rate or other physiological changes (Zillman, 1978, 1988). The emotional experience isnt determined by our detection of biological changes, but rather may be contingent on how we appraisal of the stimulant drug, and our memory (i.e. prior experience) and general knowledge about the stimulus. For example, an individual who sudd enly comes face to face with a lion will correctly judge that this animal can kill and therefore his life is under threat. This appraisal in turn will produce fear. Similarly, the person may remember that he was viscously attacked the last time he met a lion, and/or more probably be aware of the fact that big carnivorous cats kill people.Another problem with the Schachter and Singer model is their failure to account for how people cope with threat or danger. They break that physiological arousal elicits emotional arousal, so that they relationship between the two variables is always positive. However, theories on coping propose that two people confronted with the same trying event may experience marked different intensities of anxiety. More specifically Janis and Manns (1977) conflict-theory argued that the level of intensity experienced varies depending on how people deal with try on generated by uncertainty what to do. Complacency results in little or no emotional arousal. Defe nsive avoidance refers to evasive strategies, such as denial, wishful thinking, and transformation responsibility -emotional arousal is generally low, but easily becomes intense when signs of the danger become salient. Hypervigilance denotes panic, and occurs when the danger seems spunkyly imminent (e.g. an approaching tornado, or impending illness). It is characterised by extremely high levels of emotional arousal. Finally, vigilance refers to a rational, and logical problem solving approach, and emotional arousal is considered to be moderate, rather than extremely high or low. The problem with Janis and Manns (1977) model is that to date there has been a paucity of experimental research testing the association between coping strategies and filter out levels (but see Mann Tan, 1993). However, studies have demonstrated correlational relationships between coping styles and emotional arousal (Witte Allen, 2000), suggesting that the former should form an important element of Schac hter and Singers (1962) model. More specifically, it is possible that physiological changes generate strong emotions when people cope in one particular way, and little or no emotion arousal when people cope another way.Stimulus CharacteristicsSchachter and Singers (1962) model makes no reference to features of the stimulus itself. Rogers (1983) argued that the way we respond emotionally to a stimulus, specifically a threatening communication such as a health warning, depends on how we perceive aspects of the stimulus. He argued that dangerous events, such as a probable illness or impending natural disaster contain cues as to the probability of the event, and its seriousness or magnitude. The greater our estimates of the seriousness of a threat, and its probability of occurrence, the greater the level of anxiety experienced. In other words, stimulus characteristics determine the intensity of our emotional experience. A large volume of research published since the mid 1970s has found ample evidence in complement of Rogers (1983) ideas (see reviews by Eagly Chaiken, 1993 Milne et al, 2000). In fact Rogers formulations continue to influence professional thinking especially in trying to understand peoples emotional reactions to threatening health communications. It can be argued that Rogerss ideas do not invalidate Schachter and Singers (1962) model. Stimulus characteristics may simply be something else people consider, in addition to monitoring their physiological parameters, and trying to work out the situation. Or perhaps Rogerss appraisals fit in with Schachter and Singers emphasis on appraisals of the situation. Thus, if people perceived the situation as highly dangerous, because of the high severity and probability of the danger, then they would interpret their physiological arousal as fear.METHODOLOGICAL AND ANALYTICAL ISSUESCritique of Schachter and Singers two-factor model requires closer interrogation of the evidence they present in support of their mo del. Various methodological and analytic constraints limit the conclusions that may be drawn (Coolican, 1994). Firstly, the study design is questionable. This study was develop up as a between- congregations design with subjects assigned to either one of two physiological arousal conditions a treatment group (injected with adrenaline), or placebo group (given a saline condition). There was no control group. The presence of a control group is significant because it allows the researcher to demonstrate that spy effects were not simply a result of the anticipatory effects of interventions (treatment or placebo) given to subjects. Another problem with the design was the failure to control for background variables that may befuddle treatment effects. In particular, subjects baseline emotions prior to the study should have been accounted for in the analysis, in order to partial out any pre-intervention differences between groups. The population was a sample of introductory psychology students. This kind of sample is generally better informed that the average man on the street, and have been able to decipher the researchers hypotheses, and consequently provide responses intended to confirm or refute the predictions. The sample size was also rather limited (just over a 100), making it more heavy to detect statistically significant differences between the groups. This may partly explain the absence of group differences in self-reports of anger between the adrenaline-ignorant and adrenaline-informed groups. The anger condition was toughened because it was felt that subjects didnt want to display anger towards the experimenter regarding their participation in the experiment. The sample was not randomly recruited meaning that the findings may in fact be specific to the particular subjects used, and may not generalise accurate to the wider population.CONCLUSIONSPerhaps the best evidence in support of the two-factor model lies in the difference observed between the t hree information conditions amongst subjects injected with adrenaline. Those in the adrenaline-ignorant and adrenaline-misinformed group reported the highest happiness levels, presumably because, lacking information about why they were experiencing physiological arousal, there mechanically assumed that they felt that way because they were happy. This demonstrates two things. Firstly, it shows that physiological arousal may elicit an emotional experience (intensity), and secondly that an understanding of the situation led to a particular type of emotional experience happiness. This confirms supports the two-factor proposition that emotional experience is a function of the interaction between physiological and situational (i.e. cognitive) factors. Nevertheless, the evidence is questionable, largely out-of-pocket to the absence of a control group, and also the small sample size. Schachter and Singers analysis also fails to account for other factors that may moderate that may have an fencesitter effect on emotional experience, regardless of physiological arousal, such coping strategy, memory, prior experience, and general knowledge. There is a strong possibility that the impact of physiological arousal may be significantly attenuated after accounting for additional factors. In essence, emotional experience in certain circumstances may be driven solely by cognitive factors (i.e. thoughts, perceptions, memory), with biological changes have little or no effect peoples emotional response.REFERENCESCannon, W. 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